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Abstract -  Two important topics related to the cloud security are discussed in 
this chapter: the authentication of logical users accessing the cloud, and the secu-
rity of data stored on public cloud servers. A real cloud platform is used as exam-
ple; it is designed and implemented to support basic web applications, and to be 
shared by small and medium companies. Such platform is built using the Open-
Stack architecture. The user authentication is based on an original biometric ap-
proach exploiting  fingerprints, and open to multimodal improvements. The plat-
form guarantees secure access of multiple users and complete logical separation 
of computational, and data resources, related to different companies. High-level 
of protection of the data, stored in the cloud, is ensured by adopting a peculiar 
data fragmentation approach.  
Details are given about the authentication process, and of the service modules 
involved in the biometric authentication.  Furthermore are discussed the key is-
sues, related to the integration of the biometric authentication, in the cloud plat-
form. 
 
1. Introduction 
The migration, from local to web applications, is probably  one of the most  sig-
nificant advances of the recent years, in the arena of the application software:  
sharing critical data and resources and giving support to multi-user/multi-tenancy 
scenarios. The development of service-oriented architectures (SOA), and WEB 
services, are key issues in all frameworks. SOAs support designing and develop-
ing, in  terms of services with distributed capabilities, which can be under the con-
trol of different ownership domains. These architectures are essentially a collec-
tion of services or, in different terms, entities performing single or a limited num-
ber  of repeatable activities and communicating with each other by simple data 
passing. Service consumers view a service provider as a communication endpoint 
supporting a particular request format or contract; this request format (or inter-
face) is always separated from  the service implementation. 
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As a matter of course, security breaches on web  applications are a major concern 
because they can involve both enterprise, and private customer data: protecting 
these assets is then an important part of any web application development. This 
process usually  includes  authentication and authorization steps, asset handling, 
activity logging, auditing. A variety of protection mechanisms has been devel-
oped, for this purpose, like: password management, encryption, intrusion preven-
tion, and vulnerability analysis. The extension of the web application paradigm to 
the cloud computing model is denoted as software as a service (SaaS). The adop-
tion of Cloud computing, in particular leveraging on the public and hybrid models 
[1], involves many advantages in terms of flexibility, scalability and reliability, 
but also implies new challenges on security, data privacy and protection of per-
sonal data.  
Literature is vast on this topic and different risks, and vulnerabilities have been 
extensively studied and highlighted [2,3]. Attacks to cloud systems are becoming 
more targeted and sophisticated [4], since attackers know that cloud storage are 
becoming one of the most adopted way to archive and share personal information. 
Incidents of data leakage from the cloud are increasingly frequent, and affects also 
big players like Apple, PlayStation and others [5,6,7]. These vulnerabilities are 
accompanied by collateral legal and reputational risks that should be regulated by 
national governments. U.S. and European Union have enacted regulatory re-
quirements applicable to data stored by cloud providers [8]. The security specific 
risks of the cloud are primarily derived from the complexity of the architecture, 
which includes different models of services and distribution. Furthermore there 
are risks related to the characteristics of multi-tenancy and resource sharing, al-
lowing to allocate the same resources in different times to different users [9].  
A first element of risk is related to the failure of the isolation systems for storage  
and computational resources. When data reside  on the same physical infrastruc-
ture, a failure of the isolation systems can compromise machines hosted  through 
guest-hopping, SQL injection and side channel attacks [10]. Individuals and or-
ganizations may have different interests and requirements, or even conflict-
ing/competing  objectives. To this concern, it is necessary to protect data and sys-
tems using methods that guarantee the physical and logical separation of re-
sources, and data flows [11]. Moreover, being the Cloud a distributed architecture, 
this implies an increased use of networks, and data communication flows, com-
pared to traditional architectures. For example, data must be transferred for the 
synchronization of images, of the same virtual machine, among various and dis-
tributed hardware infrastructures. Or else, simple storage operations can involve 
communication between central systems and cloud remote clients. Risks are, 
therefore, those of incurring on sniffing, spoofing, man-in-the-middle and side 
channel attacks. An additional element of risk is related to the cloud model adopt-
ed. In fact, some cloud models require the user to transfer part of the control over 
his own data to the service provider. In this case, not only the data are allocated 
on the provider's servers, but also the user cannot apply specific protection mech-
anisms like encryption or access control, as the service provider is the sole subject 
having total control of the cloud resources. Finally, some key roles for managing 
the cloud infrastructure, such as system administrators and managers of security 
systems, must be considered. These  actors usually  have the power to perform all 
types of activities, within the system, and this would potentially break  safety re-
quirements imposed by corporate policies. Yet, the assessment of this kind of 
fraudulent actions is very complex and there is a lack of  certification agencies 
internationally recognized for the independent evaluation of cloud security . 
The “remote user authentication” or “logical access control”, is one of the funda-
mental steps in protecting  data and IT infrastructures. Authentication protocols 
allow  to verify that each of the participants in the electronic communication is 
really who he claims to be. This task is commonly demanded to a specialized ar-
chitecture denoted as the Authentication Server (AS). The AS preserves and man-
ages the access keys to the various subsystems. In order to access private services 
or data, each authorized person must first establish a connection with the AS, de-
clare  and prove his own identity and obtain a session key useful to require  fur-
ther services.  Currently, the most common authentication mechanisms of the ASs  
make use of passwords and private tokens. Passwords are subject to various secu-
rity threats; for example, they  can be easily stolen or intercepted and used  fraud-
ulently. Tokens are more difficult to be reproduced and for this reason  they are 
often used in banking services. However, being more expensive and difficult to 
manage, they are far to be an optimal solution. Moreover,  they are usually based 
on the  possession of  a physical  card or device that can be easily shared with 
different people.  
As reported in the scientific literature [12,13], the efficient use of multiple bio-
metric features for identity verification is still an open and attracting scientific 
problem; biometric physical access systems are perceived as reliable [12],  then 
minimizing the typical risks of traditional authentication systems, in applications 
that require a high level of security like  border control. On the other hand, the use 
of biometric data for the logical access to IT services is a more challenging and 
still unsolved problem. Certainly, the use of biometric techniques can be consid-
ered as one way to ensure a significant increase of security  in the authentication 
protocols managed by modern authentication servers. 
One of the criticisms of some biometric approach is related to privacy risks. In 
particular, this has to do with the storage of images or other biometric features in 
the database of the authentication server, in order to be compared during the 
recognition phase. This images are considered as sensitive data and should be 
protected with high secure systems [14]. Hence, according to privacy regulations 
it is not possible to outsource these data to cloud services. Authors use often tech-
niques, to overcome this problem, as fuzzy biometric templates, based on the 
fuzzy vault of Jules and Sudan [15], for instance, the Biometric Encryption 
scheme by Soutar et. al. [16], Cancelable Biometrics by Ratha et. al. [17], robust 
bit extraction schemes based on quantization, e.g. of Linnartz and Tuyls [18], of 
Chang et. al. [19], and of Chen et. al. [20], and applications of the fuzzy commit-
ment scheme of Juels and Wattenberg [21] to biometric templates, e.g., the con-
structions of Martini and Beinlich [22] for fingerprints. Authors in [23] propose a 
solution, using a compact representation of the biometric feature, converted using 
Scale Invariant Feature Transform (SIFT) representation: only this model is used 
to recognize the user, and stored in the cloud, thus it is not required to protect sen-
sible data.   
In this chapter, we present an example of Cloud system [23,24] that uses  bio-
metric authentication based on fingerprints [25]. This advanced access control is 
combined with a very peculiar fragmentation technique guaranteeing the security 
of the data residing on the cloud architecture. In section 2 some preliminary con-
siderations concerning the cloud platform are introduced while in section 3 an 
example of Cloud system is described in detail and the main results on the cloud 
security are discussed. Section 4 draws some conclusions, pointing out issues and 
problems that will be faced in the near future. 
2. Preliminaries 
2.1 Cloud platform 
OpenStack [26] is an open source project that many identify as the first true Cloud 
Operating System. OpenStack has to be considered as a basic technology rather 
than a solution; by analogy is often associated with the Linux kernel.  
The example of project [23,24] described in this chapter has the primary goal of 
supporting basic web applications shared by small and medium companies; 
candidate platforms for Cloud computing should be, therefore, oriented to 
scalability, to be implemented according to the public or private Cloud models. In 
this respect, OpenStack has many interesting features; it allows a prompt and  
elastic control of computing resources such as CPUs, storage and networks, and 
includes features for general system management, process automation and security.  
OpenStack consists of several individual sub-components. This modular design 
improves flexibility because each component may be used alone or in combination 
with others. Some of these modules, marked as cores (such as compute, storage, 
networking) represent the essential parts of the platform. Other modules are 
initially placed in an incubator from which they come only if needed.   
The main modules of OpenStack, fully distributable and replicable, are the 
following: computing (Nova), networking (Neutron), image templates (Glance), 
block (Cinder) and object storage (Swift), graphical interface platform accessible 
via the web (Horizon), authentication, the native orchestration module (Heat) and 
accounting (Keystone). The architecture is based on the concept of "sharing 
nothing" that make components independent and self-sufficient, avoiding the 
sharing of memory or storage. Communications between the different modules are 
asynchronous and are managed by queue managers (message brokers) that 
implement the Advanced Message Queuing Protocol (AMQP). The various 
services communicate with each other through specific Application Programming 
Interfaces (APIs) that implement the REST model. All these features make 
OpenStack an ideal tool to be deployed on commodity hardware, with consequent 
economic benefits and flexibility. 
Virtualization is an important element of cloud computing because it guarantees the 
required elasticity in resource allocation. Virtualization is a technique that allows to 
run multiple virtual machines on a single physical server and to optimize the 
available resources. It is possible to provide different levels of abstraction that 
make the operating system do not see the physical hardware but the virtual 
hardware. This abstraction is achieved by a software layer, called hypervisor, 
which is usually integrated into the operating system kernel and  it is loaded at 
system startup. The hypervisor does not offer any management capabilities to 
virtual machines. Like many of the cloud computing platforms also OpenStack is 
not released with a specific hypervisor;  the system administrator can choose  
among a set of  supported hypervisors like VMware, Hyper-V, Xen and KVM. In 
this project the Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) is used; it is one of the most 
supported and popular among scientific developers.  KVM is a Linux kernel 
module that allows a user program to use hardware virtualization capabilities of 
various processors. It supports in particular processors from AMD® and Intel® (x86 
and x86_64) having these features (Intel VT or AMD-V). From the point of view 
of the operating system each virtual machine is seen as a regular Linux process that 
can use the hardware resources according to what established by the scheduler. A 
normal Linux process has two execution modes: kernel and user. KVM adds a third 
mode, a guest mode that has its own kernel and user modes. The main benefit of 
KVM is that being integrated into the kernel improves performance and reduce the 
impact on existing Linux systems. 
2.2 Data security 
A possible solution, to guarantee the security of data residing on distributed cloud 
infrastructure, is the use of systems for the fragmentation and distribution of data, 
which allow to split the data into fragments and disperse them on all machines 
available to the cloud. In this way the recovery and the use of the data is very 
complex for an unauthorized user. By using fragmentation techniques, it is possible 
to distribute data on platforms of different providers,  and to problems arising from 
the lack of trust in the service provider. However, in order to achieve a proper 
fragmentation, and distribution of the data in the network, it is necessary to develop 
support tools to ensure the prompt availability and integrity of these data, without 
increasing the complexity of the system. In fact, an excessive consumption of 
resources or performance degradation related to procedures of information retrieval 
would compromise this approach.  
The use of fragmentation techniques to protect outsourced data is not a novel 
approach in literature. Different solutions have been proposed, however the most 
prominent ones use cryptography to obfuscate data [27,28] and traditional 
relational databases [29,30], exploiting sharding functionalities. The approach 
proposed in this paper, is completely different and original, since disclaims these 
two elements. The solution proposed avoid cryptography, seen as an excessive 
overhead to data retrieval processes, since encryption makes it not always possible 
to efficiently execute queries, and evaluate conditions over the data. Moreover, 
another innovative aspect regards the use of modern database platforms, which 
embracing the NoSQL paradigm are characterized by highly scalable distributed 
architectures. These platforms include also native management features 
(redundancy, fault tolerance, high availability) which permit to design simple 
fragmentation systems without the burden of having to implement this complex 
control systems.  
3. An example of cloud platform 
3.1 General implementation of the Cloud System 
The  meaning of the term “node” usually relates to individual  machines running 
the functions of the cloud. In some cases a node corresponds to a  physical 
machine, in other cases it corresponds to an instance of a virtual machine (VM). 
OpenStack has a distributed nature; therefore, during installation it is necessary to 
take account of the number of nodes required for the installation of the platform.   
From the official documentation of OpenStack, the minimum number of nodes to 
be used in a stable installation is five, at least one for each of the following 
functions: Horizon, Keystone, Neutron, Nova, Swift. In particular: 
• Neutron is the system that allows to manage the network connectivity and 
to address the VMs in the cloud. It includes some features of type 
"networking as a service" that support the use of advanced networking. 
• Swift is a distributed storage system that can accommodate data of users 
of the platform or VMs. It allows  to manage the policies of replication 
and consistency ensuring the integrity, safety and protection of distributed 
data in the cloud. 
• Keystone manages all security policies, privileges, and authorization for 
user access to the platform. It provides API client authentication, service 
discovery, and distributed multi-tenant authorization. 
• Horizon is a graphical interface platform accessible via the web, for easy 
and intuitive management of the cloud.    
• Nova is designed to provide power massively scalable, on demand, self-
service access to compute resources. It is developed to manage and 
automate computer resources, and can works with several virtualization 
technologies. 
• Glance  is the Virtual Machine Image Repository, or a catalog of images 
of the operating system that users can use to instantiate VMs. 
• Cinder allows to provide storage that can be used by Nova to serve the 
VMs. Storage is provided in the form of block storage device and may be 
required as a service without reference to the real physical allocation.  
• Heat  is the native orchestration module of processes of the cloud. 
In the considered system [23,24] one module of OpenStack is not installed: 
Ceilometer, which allows monitoring and billing use of cloud resources.  Figure 
1(top) highlights the distribution of modules in the nodes; the network 
configuration of the platform  is illustrated in figure 1 (bottom).  
The architecture is divided in two different Italian data centers located in Alghero 
and Turin. Each server stands on a virtual private LAN: we have a server in Turin, 
which uses the em1 interface, while another server, in Alghero, uses the interface 
em4. The other network adapters are used to configure the three networks necessary 
for the operation of OpenStack. The public network is used to allow the connection 
of the virtual machines to the outside (Internet). For this network it is necessary to 
configure a virtual interface for the Neutron  node with a public IP address. This 
interface will then be used to configure the bridge virtual audience (br-pub) 
managed by Neutron. The management network interconnect physical hosts and 
virtual machines, which are the functional nodes of the cloud platforms. These 
nodes are equipped with the software modules of OpenStack, as described in the 
bottom part of the figure 1. A Virtual Private Network (VPN) has been set-up to 
ensure secure communication between these nodes (which manage all data 
transiting in the cloud). The Turin node has been configured as the VPN server, 
using the bridge tap0, attached to the interface em2. The host of Alghero and the 
nodes hosted in the same server connect to the VPN server through another bridge 
tap0, always on the respective interface  em2 (see figure 1). 
The data network instead is the channel reserved for communication between 
virtual machines. OpenStack manage this kind of communication through the 
creation of ad-hoc overlay-network, which use Generic Routing Encapsulation 
(GRE) tunnels to encapsulate traffic. A tunnel is established between the two hosts 
and the other two tunnels between the same host and the Neutron node. 
Keystone provides authentication and accounting for the entire platform, and it is 
installed on a dedicated virtual machine, on the physical server of Alghero. This is 
necessary to facilitate its interface with a dedicated biometric authentication, via 
private network connection; the service is hosted in the authentication server (AS) 
of the data center, but externally with respect to the platform OpenStack. 
       
 
Fig.1 (top) the subdivision of Open Stack functions between our two Italian data centers of Alghero 
and Turin: services Nova and Heat have a physical machine on the server of Turin and all other ser-
vices are arranged on virtual nodes. (bottom) the general network configuration of the Cloud platform. 
3.2 Integration of biometric recognition with the cloud platform 
The recognition system is implemented in an isolated authentication server (AS), 
which exposes the necessary API for ensuring interoperability with the rest of the 
system. The API includes a minimal set of functions providing: registration 
(enrollment) of a new user in the system, identification of a user, cancellation of a 
registered user. 
The authentication system is designed to be scalable in horizontal on multiple 
computing nodes and vertical optimizing the CPU performance, through the 
parallel computation inside the node, in which it operates. To improve processing 
time, at start- up of the computing node, the whole set of information related to the 
users is copied directly into RAM to cancel the disk access times. With the current 
service configuration (1 node with 4 vCPU) the total time of identification is 
calculable, on average, in 3/10 of a second per registered user.  
A VPN is placed between the system and the desktop user application. When the 
VPN encrypted tunnels is enabled, the user starts the session simply touching the 
fingerprint scanner. This VPN selectively enables the services that can be accessed 
by the user: at the start of the process the user only sees the API server while, if 
authenticated, the system creates a route to the GUI. In this way, communications 
between the client and the API are always protected and the session ID is never 
transmitted in clear.  
3.2.1 Biometric recognition  
The desktop application includes software modules both for  the enrollment and the 
authentication of users. During enrollment, the new user’s fingerprint is converted 
into a compact representation, called model; only this model will be used to 
recognize the user, thus it is not required to store the fingerprints in the AS 
database; only the models are recorded.  
The features characterizing the model are obtained by using the Scale Invariant 
Feature Transform (SIFT) representation [31,33]. Recently SIFT has emerged as a 
cutting-edge methodology in general object recognition as well as for other 
machine vision applications [31-35]. One of the interesting features of the SIFT 
approach is the capability to capture the main local patterns working on a scale-
space decomposition of the image. In this respect, the SIFT approach is similar to 
the Local Binary Patterns method [36,37], with the difference of producing a more 
robust view-invariant representation of the extracted 2D patterns.  
The matching for the authentication application is performed considering the SIFT 
features located along a regular grid and matching overlapping patches; in 
particular, the approach subdivides the images in different sub-images, using a 
regular grid with a light overlap. The matching between two images is then 
performed by computing distances between all pairs of corresponding sub-images, 
and therefore averaging them [34].  A fusion module takes the final decision. 
The fingerprint scanner used for the purpose of the project has a 1 inch x 1 inch 
sensor and is certified by FBI according to PIV (Personal Identity Verification) 
Image Quality Specifications. These technologies ensure a good quality and 
performance level, currently unreachable with most commercial devices.  
3.2.2 Performance of the authentication system 
Our authentication system, based on SIFT [23,24,34], is tested on a subset of the 
Biosecure database [38]. More in detail, we used a subset including two different 
acquisitions (A and B) of the same fingerprint for 50 persons,  randomly extracted 
from the original database of 400 subjects. The dataset  contains features extracted 
in a realistic acquisition scenario, balanced gender, and population distributions. 
We made the comparison between each fingerprint A, against the fingerprints B of 
all 50 persons, for a total number of 2500 comparisons. We used normalized scores 
to express the similarity between two biometric  patterns. The higher is the score is, 
the higher is the similarity between the biometric patterns.  
The access to the system is granted only, if the score for a trained person 
(identification), or the person that the pattern is verified against (verification), is 
higher than a certain given  threshold. Depending on the choice of the classification 
threshold, between all and none of the impostor, patterns will be erroneously 
accepted by the system. The threshold, dependent fraction of the falsely accepted 
patterns, divided by the number of all impostor patterns, is called False Acceptance 
Rate (FAR). Again depending on the value of the threshold, between none and all, 
also a varying number of genuine  patterns will be falsely rejected. The fraction of 
the number of rejected genuine patterns, divided by the total number of genuine 
patterns, is called False Recognition Rate (FRR). The distributions of the genuine 
and the impostors scores sometimes overlap, and it is not easy the choice of the 
threshold value.  
 
Fig.2 Estimation of the normal distributions for genuine and impostors, in the dataset. 
 
 Mean St Dev 
Genuine 29.3 ± 9.7 
Impostors 1.9 ± 1.0 
Tab.1 Normal distributions for genuine and impostors 
To this purpose, the  distributions for genuine users and impostors are estimated in 
figure 2. The threshold is tuned in such a way to give suitable FAR and FRR rates. 
Table 1 are shown the estimated mean and standard deviation for our distributions, 
while in table 2 are expressed the estimations of FAR and FRR, on such 
distributions are given, varying the matching threshold.  
Matching 
Threshold 
FAR FRR 
6 4.060E-05 0.00012 
7 2.760E-07 0.00016 
8 6.430E-10 0.00023 
9 5.140E-13 0.00032 
10 1.410E-16 0.00044 
11 1.320E-20 0.00059 
Tab.2 Estimations of FAR and FRR, varying the matching threshold 
It is possible to note, in table 2,  that with a high threshold (eg. 10) the FAR is 
virtually zero (no impostors enter into the system), without causing actual drop in 
FRR performance. In fact a FRR = 0.00044 corresponds to the above threshold 
value, which means that only in 44 cases over 100000 the system rejects genuine 
fingerprints. 
3.2.3 Automation of the biometric access 
Registration Process 
Before registration process starts, a secure channel is created through a VPN. Next, 
the client sends new user’s data to the system. The API service receives two files in 
JSON format, containing the meta-data that are generated during fingerprint 
acquisition. The JSON object also contains the user’s company name. After 
receiving user data properly, the system initiates an automated procedure for set up 
the virtualized environment that will host the user’s services. A general overview of 
the process is represented in the figure 3. 
During registration (figure 3 left), the service API does the following: 
1) add user to API service list;  
2) add user to AS; 
3) add user to OpenStack Keystone  
4) add user to OpenVPN Server 
5) create a new Stack with OpenStack HEAT 
                              
Fig 3. The components and workflow of the registration procedure are shown in the left diagram, 
while figure on the right is related to the authentication procedure. 
At this stage, automated checks on each component are carried out. Given the 
complexity and heterogeneity of the resources involved, the system will conduct 
checks to prevent misalignment between Authentication needed configuration 
service, Keystone, OpenVPN server and API service. Therefore, the registration 
process ends when at least one of the operations listed above fails. Initially, the 
system calculates the new user’s ID, password and a network CIDR. The   
password is generated by random algorithm, and it is used by the API service to 
communicate with Keystone and manage cloud services. Therefore, in order to 
make the whole system even safer, no other component will possess credentials. 
Continuing, the API service sends the username and password to the AS that 
registers the new user. If the registration is not successful, the AS returns an error 
message, and the whole process stops. The API service requires a token in 
Keystone to create a new user. The interactions between Keystone and API service 
is done through the OpenStack API endpoint, called Identity.  
During the registration process, a VPN certificate is automatically generated and 
provided to the user. This should be used by the user every time a connection with 
the cloud services is established. In this phase, the automation is in charge of to the 
OpenVPN server which accepts as input (communication done using a Rest API 
Interface) the user name and the network’s CIDR, and returns the OVPN 
certificate, ready to be used on the VPN client. The OpenVPN server set up correct 
routing rules that allow user access to the network and thus to its services. The 
rules will take effect only if user is authenticated successfully. OpenStack has 
images of virtual machines, pre-configured and ready to use. The API service sends 
a request to create a new stack. A Stack consists of a set of virtual machines 
connected to a new network. The network is then connected to a virtual router. All 
these operations are carried out automatically by the machine-accessible 
orchestrator Heat. This hardest operation of the entire process because it involved 
almost all OpenStack services: Nova for the creation of virtual machines, Neutron 
security groups, ports, subnets and vRouter interfaces. Finally, API service has 
successfully completed all operations and returns to the desktop client, the Open 
VPN certificate. 
Authentication Process 
The procedure for authenticating the user is shown in figure 3 (right). Before 
performing any operation, the user connects to the system with its OpenVPN 
certificate. When the client desktop finishes to acquire and convert the fingerprint, 
sends the file to the API service through a VPN tunnel. The data is transmitted to 
the AS and if user is recognized, AS returns a pair of  values (that are username and 
password). The credentials will also be used in this case (as happens in the 
registration process) by API service, GUI and OpenStack. According to result of 
authentication stage, the API service creates or not a new session. When the user is 
correctly recognized the API service generates new PHP session by creating a 
session file in PHP session path containing usernames, passwords, token 
(OpenStack) and stackID. The username and password parameters are supplied 
from the AS, while stackID is obtained by consulting a list on the API service and a 
token is generated  by an automatic procedure. The API service connects to 
OpenStack Keystone requesting the token that will be used  to manages the Virtual 
machines (start, stop, resume, etc.). Finally, the API service has completed its task 
and returns the generated session ID to desktop client.  
At this stage, the user can access to services simply connecting to the URL via 
browser. When the user makes a request for service management, the GUI server 
interacts with Nova and other OpenStack services, through the REST API. All    
the automation layer is run with PHP with a light framework which is able to 
manage processes quickly. When the user leaves the GUI, the session is destroyed 
and all environmental variables used for service management are  removed. 
It is worth to highlight some aspects of the implemented security procedure: 
• User and password to access the Cloud are never transmitted out of the 
cloud itself. 
• Web GUI, AS and private cloud controller are not accessible outside the 
cloud. 
• Sensitive data residing on the Cloud (fingerprint model file) are compared 
inside the cloud.  
• The data transfer is not related to the user (nobody outside the cloud can 
associate the model file with some user information). 
3.3 Data security 
Cloud computing services and applications must face various challenges, including 
latency, unreliability, malicious behavior; most of these challenges are related to 
the public shared environment in which cloud services are hosted. In particular, 
security of outsourced data is still one of the main obstacles to cloud computing 
adoption in public bodies and enterprises. The main reason is impossibility to trust 
the cloud provider due to the lack of control that the user has over the 
infrastructure, an issue intrinsic of the public cloud model. Algorithms have to be 
developed to cope with these challenges and innovative architectures.  
In this project is proposed a secure, and high availability, data chunking solution 
based on innovative distributed cloud storage architecture. The basic idea is to 
share data in small chunks, and spread them on, different VMs hosted on cloud 
computing. The complete control of the distributed storage system is delegated to 
the user who hosts the master node of the system, as shown in figure 4. The master 
node maintains the namespace tree and the mapping of blocks to the slaves nodes. 
Thus, only the user knows the location of the chunks needed to recompose the data. 
Even if a malicious user can access to one of the nodes which possess the chunks 
he cannot use it as the information is incomplete.  
 
Fig. 4  Architecture of the distributed storage system 
This solution is a viable countermeasure also for malicious behavior of the cloud 
provider. Some of the features of the proposed solution are: 
• distributed storage system implemented in cloud, with client-server 
architecture and partially trusted environment;  
• security granted by chunking data and spreading it on different nodes (VM) 
possibly hosted by different cloud providers; 
• availability and resiliency ensured by the redundancy of nodes and replica of 
chunks; 
• the possibility to use different cloud providers prevent also the so-called 
vendor “lock-in”. 
3.3.1 Distributed Storage Systems 
There are two main categories of distributed storage systems architectures: Peer-to-
Peer and client-server [39]. The latter architecture has been chosen for the 
implementation because best fit the objectives of the proposed solution. A client-
server based architecture revolves around the server providing a service to 
requesting clients. The server is the central point, responsible for authentication, 
sharing, consistency, replication, backup and servicing requesting clients. In our 
implementation the master node embraces the server’s role and slave nodes the 
client’s role. As slaves nodes are hosted on the cloud, the system operates in a 
partially trusted environment; users are exposed to a combination of trusted and 
untrusted nodes [39].  
In Distributed Storage Systems data can be replicated across multiple geographical 
sites to improve redundancy, scalability, and data availability, as shown in figure 4.  
Although these solutions provide the scalability and redundancy that many cloud 
applications require, they sometimes do not meet the concurrency and performance 
needs because of the latency due to the network [40]. Some examples of the most 
known distributed storage systems are HDFS, Ceph , MooseFS, mongoDB. 
3.3.2 Architecture of the system 
The architecture of the solution is comprised of interconnected nodes where files 
and directories reside. There are two types of nodes the master node, that manages 
the filesystem namespace and regulates client access to files and the slave node 
which stores data as blocks within files. All nodes communicate with each other 
using TCP-based protocols. The mechanism of data protection does not rely on 
RAID approaches, but the file content is replicated on multiple slaves for 
reliability. Master and slave nodes can run in a decoupled manner across 
heterogeneous operating systems, and on different cloud providers. The complete 
control of the system is delegated to the master node, which maintains the 
namespace tree and the mapping of blocks to slave nodes. Slave nodes have little 
intelligence and not know the location of other slaves or chunks of data.  
User applications access the system using a specific client, a library that exports the 
filesystem interface. When a user wants to perform a reading action on filesystem, 
the client first asks the master node for the list of namenodes that host the chunks 
of the file. After that, the client contacts a slave node directly and requests the 
transfer of the desired block. Instead, when a user wants to write on the filesystem, 
it first asks the master to choose slaves to host chunks of the file.  All decisions 
concerning replication of the chunks are taken by the master node. This ensures the 
reliability of the data and the fault tolerance of the system.  
4. Conclusion 
A complete system for web applications, and data management over the Cloud, is 
presented and it is coupled with strong biometric authentication, The system 
guarantees the identity of the users and makes easy, and secure, the access to data 
and services. Moreover, the adoption of a data chunking solution is proposed, 
which is based on a distributed cloud storage architecture. This provides protection 
of data residing also from provider’s administrators, and hardware supervisors. A 
further improvement of the system will extend biometric access to multimodal 
techniques, thus including face and face+fingerprint authentication. The 
development of a web server application for the user side, aimed to avoid the 
installation of local software, will be also pursued. 
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